Jury Selection—Key-Man System Eliminated by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 42 Number 1 
10-1-1966 
Jury Selection—Key-Man System Eliminated 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Jury Selection—Key-Man System Eliminated, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 280 (1966). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol42/iss1/11 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
was outside carrier insurer liability should be placed upon the carrier,
while the burden of proving that the carrier's negligence proximately
caused the damage should be placed upon the shipper. While this
division of proof has the disadvantage of complicating litigation, it
provides a balance between carrier acceptance of responsibility which
is properly the shipper's, and preservation of carrier motive to exercise
due care. A divided risk of damage was the rule at common law, and,
as codified by the Carmack Amendment,3" should also be that of the
United States despite unfortunate intimations to the contrary in the
principal case.
JURY SELECTION-KEY-MAN SYSTEM ELIMINATED
Defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury for perjury. The
jury commissioner solicited names of prospective jurors from various
"key-men," community leaders who had been instructed in the qualifi-
cations which the jury commissioner felt prospective jurors should
have. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed
the indictment. Held: Key-man jury selection violates the standards
for jury selection prescribed by the Civil Rights Act of 1957.' Rabin-
owitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
With passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, amending 28 U.S.C. §
1861, the states lost control over qualifications of federal jurors.2 That
act together with the establishment in Glasser v. United States,' of
the rule that a jury must represent a cross-section of the community
from which it was selected, set forth the criteria for juror seleotion.
"That the Carmack Amendment codifies the common law rules of carrier liabil-
ity, see Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162, 165 n.9 (1956).
171 Stat. 634, 638 (1957), which amended 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1950) to read:
Qualifications of Federal jurors
Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of twenty-one years
and who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district, is
competent to serve as a grand or petit juror unless-
(1) He has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have
not been restored by pardon or amnesty.
(2) He is unable to read, write, speak, and understand the English language.
(3) He is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmities to render
efficient jury service.
'Before the 1957 Civil Rights Act, section 1861 had a fourth subsection which
stated, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (4) (1950) :
(4) He is incompetent to serve as a grand or petit juror by the law of the
State in which the district court is held.
'315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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While two other courts have indicated that section 1861 merely set
a minimum standard,4 the principal case is the first decision construing
section 1861 as ,the sole standard for juror selection.
The majority in Rabinowitz concluded that Congressional intent to
set uniform standards for federal jury selection was clear. The court
attempted to implement the "mood of Congress [as] summarized by
its legislation,"' and cited many Congressional speakers who urged
uniform federal jury standards. The 1957 Senate debates were quoted
extensively by the court as indicating an intent to have uniform jury
standards promulgated by the Civil Rights Act.' Having thus estab-
lished Congressional intent, the majority rejected any possibility that
the standards of the 1957 act were merely minimum standards. The
court compared section 1861 with section 1863,' which prescribes the
procedure by which a judge may excuse a juror from service, conclu-
ding that it would be anomalous for Congress to enact a standard in
section 1861 which could give a jury commissioner more discretion
than a judge to exclude potential jurors. A jury commissioner, the
court concluded, had no latent discretion to raise standards of jurors.
Lack of such discretion and Congressional intent of uniformity con-
vinced the majority that section 1861 set a sole standard. One judge
concurred specially to avoid an evenly split court. He rejected the sole
standard test as "doctrinaire" ' and emphasized the cross-section test
as the true criterion. A dissent rejected the sole standard test, inter-
preting Glasser to permit selection of more competent jurors, and
found no language in section 1861 to compel the majority's conclusion.
'United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 878 (1962) (limited use of criterion of eighth grade education did not violate§ 1861) ; United States v. Ware, 237 F. Supp. 849 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d
787 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 919 (1966) (no proof of systematic
exclusion of pardoned convicts). Compare Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641
(1st Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied
sub nonm. Guippone v. United States, 372 U.S. 959 (1963); United States v.
Greenberg, 200 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Hoffa, 196 F. Supp.
25 (S.D. Fla. 1961), which avoid construing § 1861 and rely on the cross-section test.
Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 60 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 48-50. One example which the court said "made crystal clear" the intent
was an exchange between Senators O'Mahoney and Kefauver. The latter asked,
id. at 49, 103 CONG. REc. 13154 (1957):
Thereby [the amendment] establishes a uniform system in Federal courts all
over the United States, so that there can be no possible discrimination with
respect to anyone because of his race or color. Is that correct?
Mr. O'Mahony: The Senator is correct....
28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1962) allows a judge to exclude jurors for good cause, undue
hardship, or delay in the administration of justice, but not on account of race or
color.8 366 F.2d at 72.
1966 ]
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The court's construction of section 1861 should be compared with
the language and legislative history of that section. Section 1861
disqualifies persons from jury service who are illiterate, incapable of
rendering efficient jury service, or convicted of a crime punishable by
one year's imprisonment and remain unpardoned. The key language
of section 1861 is "competent to serve . . . unless . . . ." This is
hardly language suggestive of an affirmative duty, yet by the sole
standard test it becomes one. Before the Civil Rights Act was amended
to its present form, the opponents of state control of federal juror
selection, as permitted in section 1861 (4), advanced uniformity as
their primary argument in favor of federal standards for federal
courts."° The majority in Rabinowitz failed to recognize that unifor-
mity in this context in all probability meant no more than elimination
of state standards in selection of jurors for federal courts.
The majority and dissent made contrasting use of The Jury System
in the Federal Courts," which was approved by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States in 1960. The majority noted that the Judicial
Conference sought legislation approving selection of jurors with as
"high a degree of morality, integrity, intelligence, and common sense
' 1 -2
as is consistent with the cross-section test. As the dissent observed,
however, the 1960 Report treats the juror qualifications established
in section 1861 as minimum, rather than sole, standards which may
be upgraded as long as the cross-section test is met.3 The Report's
interpretation of section 1861 was approved in United States v. Ware'
4
and in United States v. Henderson,'- where the court stated: "Recog-
nition that the statute envisions 'efficient' service requires rejection of
a conclusion that an intelligence level equated with mere literacy was
intended to be imposed as a maximum standard .... " The majority
in the principal case stated that there was no conflct with Henderson."
9 For the full text of section 1861 see note 1 supra.
The "Knox Report," REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COmMITTEE
oN SELECTION OF JURORS (1942), represents the beginning of sustained attack on
state qualifications for federal juries. Because state standards had to be used in
each federal court there were forty-eight sets of standards with sixty-eight classes
of possible grounds for exceptions. "Knox Report" at 31-45.
"26 F.R.D. 409 (1960). [Hereinafter referred to as Report.] The Report, was
written by a committee of federal district court judges as a follow-up to the "Knox
Report," op. cit. supra note 10.
2Id. at 419, 421.
See id. at 437, and exhibit at 507-08, 513-14.
'237 F. Supp. 849 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied.
383 U.S. 919 (1966) (dictum concerning 11 D.C. CODE ANN. § 230(a) (1961) which
is parallel to § 1861). The opinion was written by one of the Report's authors, Judge
Holtzoff.
"298 F.2d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 878 (1962).
"366 F.2d at 51 n.32. By footnoting Henderson, the court avoided dealing with
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However, Henderson unquestionably construed section 1861 as cre-
ating a minimum, not a sole standard.
If any intent can be attributed to the 1957 Congress concerning
federal jury qualifications, it was that of compromise. The final draft
of section 1861 is partially the result of two compromise Senate
amendments, compelled by certain opposition to the initial version
of the bill. 17 The first of these compromise amendments provided the
right to jury trial for civil rights contempt cases.'" Northern opposi-
tion to this amendment, based on the presumed bias inherent in
Southern jury selections, resulted in a second compromise which elimi-
nated this objection by abolishing state control over jury selection
standards.' The stated purposes of the latter amendment were: (1)
uniformity of federal juror qualifications, (2) prevention of Negro
exclusion from federal juries, and (3) creation of a new civil right-the
right to serve as a juror.2u The new amendment provided for juror
qualifications acceptable to both the North and South, thereby paving
the way for passage of the entire bill. The intent of Congress, there-
fore, does not warrant the statutory construction in the principal case.
The sponsors were attempting to achieve a compromise which would
reduce opposition to the bill; however, the court overlooked this
compromise nature of the amendment, and emphasized a design for
uniform qualifications.2' It is overly creative to conclude that Con-
gress intended to set a sole standard of jury qualification-the court
in effect rewrote both legislative history and the statute.
The essential requirement of any jury is that it be composed of the
the case on its merits. The quote in text was not mentioned at all. While a
Seventh Circuit decision was not controlling in the Fifth Circuit, it deserved
more attention than a footnote.
17 The initial version of the bill was H.R. 6127, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
The House bill had no provision for juror qualifications. However, the bill made
contempt proceedings for failure to comply with a federal court order in civil
rights cases solely a matter of court discretion-jury trials were not permitted. In
the Senate, lack of a jury trial caused bitter Southern opposition to the bill. See
103 CoiTG. REc. 11003 (1957), and the preceding debates.
' This amendment, offered by Senator O'Mahoney, introduced § 1861, including
subsection (4), into the debates.
'The Church amendment merely deleted subsection (4) from § 1861 to meet
Northern objections. 103 CoxrG. REc. 13154 (1957). For statements of the Northern
opposition to the initial amendment see the remarks of Senator Javits, id. at
11566-68.
' See the statements of Senator Church, id. at 13154.
' Northern liberals opposed the Church amendment because they thought it would
not place sufficient Negroes on juries. See the comments of Senators Douglas, id.
at 13250; Clark, id. at 13276, 13289-91; and Morse, id. at 13317. These Senators
voted against the amendment because they favored a stronger one. Ironically the
Rabinowitz construction of § 1861 is apparently what they were hoping would be
written into the statute if the Church amendment failed.
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peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected to determine, 22
and Glasser requires that a federal jury represent a cross-section of
the community from which it is selected. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co.,23 the Supreme Court established six factors to be considered in
determining the cross-section of a community: racial, political, social,
geographical, religious, and economic. The cross-section test, however,
is not self-executing, and its accurate application is crucial. The
inherent discretion of a key-man jury selection increases the likelihood
of discrimination or misapplication of the cross-section test. As a
community leader known by the white jury commissioner, a Negro
selected as a key-man may be one who identifies more with prevailing
views of middle-class whites than those of the Negro community.
24
The possibility of accurate representation of the community may be
further reduced where, as in Rabinowitz, all key-men are white. In
the principal case the court should have eliminated the key-man system
to implement the purpose of the cross-section test.
25
The result in Rabinowit,26 elimination of the key-man method,
was correct, but by using the wrong approach, the court did not
meet the problem facing federal courts in the South: how to impanel
a legal jury. The concurring opinion, however, does clarify the
- Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
2328 U.S. 217 (1946).
'Cf. ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTs 236 (2d ed. 1965). The discussion
there concerns the leaders of Negro colleges, but is relevant in other situations.
' Under the cross-section test the defendant has the burden of proof in showing
that the selection system is illegal. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). This
can be difficult to prove when there are some Negroes on the jury lists. See Akins
v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). The dissent said the defendant had failed to
establish a prima facie case as had been done in United States ex reL. Seals v.
Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963) (venire
1.3% Negroes, juries 0.82% Negroes, adult population 31.7% Negroes). However,
even though proportional representation is not required, see Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S.
400 (1942), the jury list in the principal case contained only 5.8% Negroes in a
district where the total adult Negro population was 34.55%. 366 F.2d at 39. Also
when new names were added to the list in 1959, there were only four known Negroes
in 553 names. Id. at 38. It is thus apparent that on racial grounds a cross-section of
the community was in no way represented on the jury lists. The concurring opinion
was explicit on this point and its relationship to the key-men: "[O]ne thing [is]
clear. No matter how conscientious they were, the jury selectors did not add
enough names of qualified Negroes because they did not know them." Id. at 78.
The majority noted, however, that because of the statutory construction it was un-
necessary to decide the cross-section question. Id. at 51 n.33.
The majority's construction of § 1861 as a sole standard could be interpreted as
requiring jury commissioners to visit every home in the district to compile a list
of prospective jurors who meet the literal qualifications of that section. While the
logic of the opinion could reach this result, the obvious impracticality of the
solution requires its rejection. The concurring judge may have been referring to
this problem when he said: "I am not at all certain just what is decided." Id. at72.7. The 1966 Civil Rights Bill, H.R. 14765, would have solved part of the problem
by requiring use of lists of qualified voters. That bill's passage appears distant.
[ VOL. 42 : 273
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problem. That opinion relied on several Supreme Court cases28 invol-
ving application of the cross-section test to state juries, which required
jury commissioners to familiarize themselves with the identity and
availability of potentially qualified jurors in all significant elements of
the community. 9 If jury commissioners did acquaint themselves with
the community, and then combined such acquaintance with readily
available methods of obtaining names of prospective jurors (voter
registration lists, tax rolls, utilities rolls, telephone books and city
directories) , 3 they could establish impartial jury lists which reason-
ably represent a cross-section of the community. 31 The court should
have adopted the concurring judge's conclusions about the duty of
jury commissioners and thereby met the problem of juror selection
without an unnecessary statutory construction.
VALIDITY OF STATE PROPOSITION EFFECTIVELY
REPEALING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The California Legislature did not attempt to prevent property
owners from selecting buyers or tenants on the basis of racial consider-
ations until 1959. Then, by enacting the Hawkins Act' and the Unruh
Furthermore, use of voter lists would discriminate heavily against the Negro
community because Southern voter lists are unlikely to represent a cross-section of
the community until fear of reprisals for registration is eliminated. See ZINN op.
cit. supra note 23, at 138-39; The New Republic, Aug. 13, 1966, pp. 10-11. For state
and federal jury selection provision of 1966 Civil Rights Bill, see Comment, 52 VA. L.
REV. 1069 (1966).
"Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
' One week after Rabihwwitz, the Fifth Circuit accepted the arguments of the
concurring opinion in a state jury selection case. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1966).
" City directories are ideal for the urban areas of the South which have them.
However, singular use of any one source for juror selection is unsatisfactory.
In 1963 only 69% of the households in Georgia had telephones. The whole Fifth
Circuit had 63.3% while the national average is 81%. STATISTICAL A SaIUCT OF THIE
UNiTE STATES 38, 517 (1965).
Use of tax rolls would discriminate against the large number of tenants in the
South. In 1959, 24.1% of the farms in Georgia were tenant operated. The Fifth
Circuit average (excluding Florida) is 25% compared with the national average of
19.8%. Id. at 615, 621. Non-farm housing presents a similar problem. In 1960, 38%
of the Southern non-farm housing was rented (whites 33.6%, non-whites 58.4%, Id.
at 761. Unfortunately use of census lists in juror selection is prohibited by 13
U.S.C. § 9(1962).
"In Note, 75 YALE L.J. 322, 329 n.38 (1965), it was contended that the more
sources used in selecting the jury list, the more difficult it is for a judge to super-
vise the process. See also Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963), which questions how
closely Southern district court judges follow appellate decisions.
,§§ 35700-35741. Section 35720 makes it unlawful:
For the owner of any publically assisted housing accommodation which is in,
or to be used for, a multiple dwelling [or a single family dwelling], with knowl-
edge of such assistance, to refuse to sell, rent or lease or otherwise deny to or
